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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HIGH

TECH INDUSTRIES
By Stephen D. Houckt
Thank you. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak at this
symposium, which addresses important antitrust issues of particular relevance to high tech industries.
Before proceeding, I need to make some disclaimers. The first is
the usual one that my remarks do not necessarily reflect the views of the
New York State Department of Law or Attorney General. Also, since I
am lead counsel for the 19 state plaintiffs in the Microsoft case, I need to
broaden that disclaimer to include all my clients. Indeed, given the sensitive stage of the litigation, I have been enjoined -something we hope
to persuade the Court to do to Microsoft -to steer clear of that case in
my talk today. So I will preface my remarks by a version of the disclaimer sometimes seen at the outset of a film: any resemblance to real
events, persons, corporations, software monopolists or evasive multibillionaires is purely coincidental.
I am particularly grateful for this invitation because state antitrust
enforcement officials have not always been invited to join our federal
colleagues at important academic symposia like this one. The fact that I
am here today reflects, I think, the increased activity and profile of my
colleagues in New York and other state attorney general offices throughout the country.
The Antitrust Bureau of the New York State Attorney General's
Office, during my tenure, has not hesitated to litigate where necessary
and appropriate. Our caseload is unprecedented in the history of the Antitrust Bureau and, although we have many fewer lawyers, rivals that of
the federal enforcement agencies.
The Antitrust Bureau proceeds on its own in cases of primarily local
impact. While perhaps not as noteworthy as Microsoft -probably no
antitrust case in recent history is - they are nevertheless significant.
For example, in the Western New York Coupon Litigation, we achieved
the largest cash recovery ever obtained by the New York State Attorney
General on behalf of New York consumers in an antitrust case, and we
distributed it through a creative coupon program that allowed consumers
to purchase products made by both defendants and their competitors.
t Mr. Houck, formerly Chief of the New York State Antitrust Bureau, is a partner in the
New York City law firm, Reboul, MacMurray, Hewitt, Maynard & Kristol.
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Anticompetitive conduct, however, often impacts citizens in more
than one state. In those circumstances, the Antitrust Bureau may file
multistate cases in cooperation with other state antitrust enforcement
agencies, as it has recently in litigation against contact lens manufacturers and Toys 'R' Us. The Antitrust Bureau also acts, as well, in conjunction with the federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). This occurs
most commonly in merger cases where the Antitrust Bureau is often a
co-plaintiff with one of the federal agencies.
Cooperation is also increasingly common between state and federal
antitrust enforcers in conduct cases, exemplified by recent simultaneous
filings against generic drug manufacturers and, of course, Microsoft. Indeed, the Microsoft case has brought state and federal cooperation to a
new level - from coordinated investigations through intensive discovery and a lengthy trial.
New York's interest in Microsoft was piqued initially because of the
impact of the company's practices on New York consumers and businesses. At the time the Antitrust Bureau commenced its investigation
into Microsoft's practices, there was widespread concern that a consent
decree previously obtained by DOJ had exerted little constraint on
Microsoft, and there was no guarantee that a subsequent DOJ investigation would eventuate in any enforcement action.
Some have questioned the role of state attorneys general in complex
antitrust cases of nationwide import like Microsoft. The right -indeed,
the obligation - of state attorneys general to bring such cases is, however, beyond doubt. They are the chief enforcers of their state antitrust
statutes, like the Donnelly Act in New York, and have been specifically
authorized by Congress to sue parens patriae on behalf of their citizens
to redress violations of the Sherman Act.
Moreover, as the principal advocates for consumers in their respective states, the attorneys general bring a unique perspective to antitrust
enforcement which may influence all facets of a potential prosecution from the decision on whether a case should be brought to the appropriate
remedy to be sought. I have worked on a number of statekfederal antitrust enforcement 'actions and have found the cross-fertilization of ideas
invariably to be mutually beneficial. In Microsoft, we have proved that
state and federal antitrust enforcement officials can work together productively and effectively.
A key issue for both state and federal enforcement officials today and one which permeates all the symposium's panels -is how antitrust
law should be applied to so-called high tech industries. Much has been
written about the characteristics of such industries -like network effects
-that arguably require special treatment by antitrust agencies or courts.
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Some even argue that because of the supposed uniqueness of high tech
industries, antitrust law should be applied to them sparingly and cautiously, if at all.
I find such talk troubling. Indeed, my thesis this afternoon is that
antitrust enforcement officials should, if anything, be more vigilant in
their law enforcement efforts in the high tech area. I find such talk troubling, both because I don't think special antitrust treatment is warranted
for high tech industries and because it sends the wrong message. Talk
like that encourages people employed in those industries to feel that they
are entitled to dispensation from the normal rules of business conduct.
This is not the kind of encouragement they need.
On the contrary. High tech industries are often populated, if not led,
by relatively young men and women who have been extremely successful in creating a great deal of wealth for themselves and others. They
deserve considerable credit for their achievements and our thanks for developing new products and technologies that enrich our lives.
The danger, however, is that their success, youth and inexperience
may engender a certain degree of hubris that mistakenly leads them to
believe that they should be free from some of the legal strictures that
bind others -certainly from something as stodgy as the Sherman Act, an
artifact of the 19t' century. Such feelings may be reinforced because the
industries in which they labor, and indeed may have played a role in
creating, are relatively young, freewheeling and without any history of
antitrust enforcement.
To be sure, I am not advocating that antitrust enforcers disregard the
specific characteristics of an industry they are investigating. Quite the
contrary. It is axiomatic that any antitrust enforcement action take cognizance of an industry's structure, players, practices, history, likely development and so on. What I am saying is that it is wrong to encourage the
notion that special rules apply to an industry simply because someone be it industry participants, economists or counsel -denominate it "high
tech." There is no reason that basic antitrust principles, developed by
courts over the years, should apply differently to these industries as a
general matter.
Why should it be otherwise? Indeed, it's hard even to define what it
is that makes high tech industries high tech. For example, some high
tech industries may be subject to such phenomena as tipping, lock-in and
positive feedback loops while others are not. Nor is it possible to define
a high tech industry by the complexity of the manufacturing process utilized in it. In fact, significant antitrust cases - based on tried and true
antitrust principles - have been brought successfully over the years in
many industries that employ sophisticated technology, from petroleum
refining to electrical generation to telecommunications to computers.
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In light of this rich history of antitrust jurisprudence, it is shortsighted to think that we are confronting for the first time problems engendered by the application of antitrust law to high tech industries. Such
myopic thinking may lead to the false conclusion that special rules are
necessary today - as some would argue, for example, in advocating a
separate legal test for so-called technological tying cases -when general
principles developed over the years and enunciated in landmark opinions
like Jefferson Parish can and should be applied.
What then does typify what we generally perceive to be high tech
industries? Two characteristics that come to mind are the relative immaturity of an industry and relatively rapid change. These two phenomena
are, I think, related. Rapid change is most likely when a technology is
new and undeveloped, when there are many horizons to conquer, and
when large fortunes are there for the making virtually overnight. This
heady mix is likely to attract not only the best and brightest young scientists and engineers, but the most aggressive and enterprising entrepreneurs -a
positive feedback loop that accelerates the pace of
development.
What are the implications for antitrust enforcement officials? As
I've noted, the relative youth of an industry itself and\or the people employed in it may well lead to a variety of more aggressive business practices than is typically found in more mature industries. For that reason,
high tech industries may well reward heightened scrutiny - not only by
enforcement officials interested in making a case, but by private practitioners interested in providing good antitrust counsel to assure that their
clients stay out of trouble.
Of even greater potential significance is the rapid pace of change
that we have come to expect in high tech industries. As a preliminary
matter, I should note two things. The first is that the rate of technological change and innovation is so great today, and perhaps distinguishes
our industrial era from earlier ones, because the technology itself -such
as computing, word processing, fax machines and e-mail -facilitates the
aggregation, analysis, dissemination and communication of information
and ideas. The second is that the rate of innovation in a given industry is
unrelated to the concentration of market power in it. In other words,
monopolists retain an incentive to innovate, if for no other reason than to
protect the fruits of their monopoly power
A company's market power, however, may allow it unduly to influence or even control both the pace and direction of innovation in an entire industry. That is bad social policy for the reason articulated more
than 35 years ago by Judge Wyzanski in his landmark United Shoe decision, where he wrote, "[An] increased rate in the growth of ideas not
follow from an increased concentration of power. . . . [C]reativity in
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business as in other areas, is best nourished by multiple centers of activity, each following its unique pattern and developing its own esprit de
corps to respond to the challenge of competition."'
What, then, are the implications of the rapid pace of technological
development and innovation in today's high tech industries for antitrust
enforcement officials? The first is that antitrust enforcers must have the
resources, skills and abilities to conduct investigations not just thoroughly, but quickly. Without this capability, they will find themselves
conducting what amounts to a historical exercise. Even worse, the violator will have been allowed to reap the rewards of its unlawful conduct
and apply them to disadvantage competitors in other, newer technological arenas.
Likewise, courts must tailor their procedures -both in discovery
and at trial - to accommodate the pace of change in the real world. To
do otherwise is to risk irrelevancy, not just for the judiciary itself, but for
the role of antitrust law generally in high tech industries. I think everyone has learned the lessons of the government's case against IBM in the
1970s. If cases cannot be litigated in a reasonable time frame with reasonable resources, they will not be brought at all. Violators will go unpunished. There will be no deterrence. It is not only possible, but
essential, to balance the due process rights of defendants with the need
for expedition. In fact, if anything, the need to move expeditiously
works to a defendant's advantage since the government enforcement
agencies have both a steeper learning curve and the burden of proof.
The Microsoft case provides a good example of the art of the possible. There the parties were able to conduct extensive discovery over the
course of a summer for a trial commencing in October on a complaint
filed in May. Thanks to innovative trial procedures put in place by Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson, such as a limitation of 15 witnesses per side
and submission of direct testimony in written form, a verdict is likely to
be rendered within 18 months of the filing of the complaint -quite an
achievement in a Section 2 case involving complex legal and factual
issues.
Moreover, the Microsoft case is living proof of the adaptability of
the legal profession to the new rules of the game. I cite as Exhibit 1 my
co-counsel David Boies. I am told that David spent 30 days grilling the
government's economist at trial in IBM, and I can personally testify that
he needed only two days of cross-examination to destroy the defendant's
economist in the Microsoft case. I'm not sure if David's performance
reflects the fact that he's learned something in the past twenty years or
1 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 347 (1953).
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merely that he's now being compensated at government wages rather
than the hourly rates he earned as private counsel in the IBM case.
More seriously, some would argue that the rapid pace of change in
high tech industries suggests that market power may be ephemeral and
that antitrust enforcers should therefore stay their hand. I don't think that
their assumption is necessarily correct and in fact may be dead wrong.
As a result of such economic phenomena as positive feedback loops,
lock-in, low marginal costs and high barriers to entry, high tech industries may be peculiarly susceptible to the development and entrenchment
of significant market power. Indeed, as these concepts are disseminated
from bastions of academe like Cornell and become better understood in
the corporate world, I think we are likely to see business men and women taking advantage of their more sophisticated understanding of economic forces at work in their industries to gain market power through
such devices as low pricing to build volume, bundling, or tying.
Moreover, once market power is achieved, the temptation is great to
employ even more coercive devices to protect it by preventing, delaying
or controlling the development of new technologies that threaten it. That
in essence is what the Microsoft case is about. And I would note that
both the states' and DOJ's economists have testified there that, notwithstanding the dynamic nature of the software industry in general,
Microsoft's share of the Intel-based PC operating system market has remained incredibly high -over 90% -for many years now with no end
in sight.
In analyzing the impact of change in a market, one must be careful
-as always -to define markets properly. Courts should not be
deceived by the change or appearance of change in related markets.
Where the persistence of market power is linked causally to the dominant
company's anticompetitive conduct, strong medicine may be necessary
to ensure the restoration of competition.
In fact, dynamic change in related markets may suggest that there is
something seriously amiss in the stable market that can be rectified only
by altering the structure of that market to foster conditions conducive to
competition. In other words, relatively long-term stasis in a market impacted by anticompetitve conduct, while adjacent markets undergo
changes in competitors, products and market shares, may point to the
need for strong remedial measures. Relief that does nothing but prevent
a recurrence of specific anticompetitive conduct may be insufficient in
circumstances where the dominant company retains both the power and
motive to stifle innovative technologies that threaten its continued dominance, and to do so in new and different ways that can scarcely be
imagined.
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What do the courts and commentators say? There is not an excess
of learning on the subject, but what there is, is consistent. The last occasion the Supreme Court had to address in some detail the subject of relief
in a Section 2 case was its 1968 opinion revisiting Judge Wyzanski's
original consent decree in United Shoe. The Court there reaffirmed its
language in Grinnell that "relief in a Sherman Act case should... break
up or render impotent the monopoly power found to be in violation of the
Act." 2 As Justice Fortas wrote on behalf of a unanimous Court:
[I]n a Section 2 case, upon appropriate findings of
violation, it is the duty of the court to prescribe relief
which will terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the
defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure
that there remain no practices likely to result in monopo3
lization in the future.
Professors Areeda and Turner, in their treatise, concur, succinctly
summarizing the relevant law as follows: "The cases seem to say that
monopoly to which plainly exclusionary conduct appears to have made a
significant contribution is itself unlawful, and that it is the duty of the
court to assure its 'complete extirpation."' 4
A final word on intellectual property rights. There can be no doubt,
I think, that those who abuse the market power derived from their ownership of intellectual property to suppress actual or potential competition
from innovative, alternative technologies are guilty of anticompetitive
conduct -just as are those who achieve the same ends though their use
of physical assets. It would be perverse, in my view, to permit such
conduct to be protected by an assertion of purported rights in the very
intellectual property used to commit the violation. Intellectual property
rights are, after all, limited rights conferred by a beneficent government,
largely for the purpose of encouraging innovation.
Private intellectual property rights should not be allowed to trump
the antitrust laws, the fundamental public law underpinning our free market economy. Where intellectual property is used for anticompetitive
purposes, it -like any other form of property -should, in appropriate
cases, be subject to divestiture, licensing or other relief necessary to accomplish the objectives outlined by Justice Fortas in United Shoe. Any
other result would not only eviscerate the antitrust laws, but turn the
rationale underlying the grant of intellectual property rights on its head
2 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 252 (1968).
3 Id. at 250.
4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBF-RT HovENKAMP, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
PRNCIPLES AND THnm APPLICATION, 653c4 (2d ed. 1996)
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-permitting intellectual property to be used to suppress instead of encourage innovation.
While, probably inevitably, I have not avoided the Microsoft case
altogether, I trust I have not revealed anything confidential and want to
emphasize that what I've said about relief was not necessarily intended
to apply to Microsoft or any other specific litigation. Thanks again to
the Cornell Journal of Law & Social Policy for the opportunity to spend
a spring weekend in Ithaca and to address this distinguished gathering.

